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Abstract 
The use of reflexive forms of regulation is growing within the EU, in particular 
as the open method of coordination (‘OMC’) is applied to a growing number of 
contexts including employment policy, social inclusion, enterprise promotion, 
environmental  protection,  energy  policy,  and  fundamental  human  rights.  
Company law, however, seems to be an exception to this: recent activity has 
taken the form of ‘hard law’ harmonization through directives, coupled with the 
stimulation of regulatory competition through judgments of the European Court 
of Justice in relation to freedom of movement, stemming from the Centros case.  
There is a very limited ‘company law OMC’ in the form of the deliberations of 
the European Corporate Governance Forum, but there is little evidence here of 
what proponents of the OMC call ‘learning from diversity’; instead, the Forum 
appears to envisage the elimination of country-specific practices which it refers 
to  as  ‘distortions  of  competition’.    This  paper  argues  that  the  lack  of  a 
meaningful  company  law  OMC  is  likely  to  prove  a  more  serious  long-term 
obstacle  to  capital  market  integration  than  the  persistence  of  inter-country 
variations in corporate governance practices.  The example of labour law shows 
how  functional  convergence  and  a  coordinated  raising  of  standards  can  be 
achieved  by  the  dovetailing  of  the  OMC  with  social  policy  directives.    By 
contrast, the recent failure of the Takeover Directive to impose a uniform model 
of takeover regulation indicates the limits of top-down modes of harmonization.  
At the same time, the case of labour law highlights the importance of placing 
the OMC within a wider framework of legal support for fundamental rights, of 
the kind which is capable of providing a countervailing force against court-led 
deregulation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There has recently been considerable interest in the emergence of distinctive 
forms of governance in the EU, of which the open method of coordination is the 
best  known,  which  involve  the  use  of  reflexive  or  responsive  techniques  of 
regulation.    ‘Reflexive  governance’,  in  this  sense,  implies  that  diversity  of 
practice among the member states is a resource which, when coupled with open 
coordination methods such as benchmarking and mutual monitoring, provides a 
basis  for  experimentation  and  mutual  learning.    This  approach  has  been 
contrasted  to  more  traditional  forms  of  harmonization  of  laws  through 
directives, on the one hand, and to court-led regulatory competition, with its 
implication  of  deregulation,  on  the  other.    The  open  method  is  currently 
exercising considerable influence in such diverse areas as employment policy, 
social inclusion, enterprise promotion, environmental protection, energy policy, 
and fundamental human rights.   
 
Corporate governance is, however, an apparent exception to this trend.  In this 
area, the Commission, in its proposal for the measure which eventually became 
the Thirteenth Company Law Directive, on takeover bids, and its proposals for a 
rolling programme of corporate governance reforms, effectively endorsed the 
principal-agent model of corporate governance which is most closely associated 
with American, and to a lesser degree, with British practice.  The diversity in 
corporate  governance  structures  and  practices  which  currently  exists  across 
member states is, in this view, not an occasion for learning, but a potential 
distortion of competition.  
 
This paper considers the implications of the recent experience of company law 
reform for emerging forms of governance in the EU, and uses the company law 
case to frame a wider discussion of the prospects for the European social model 
during a period of market liberalisation.  Could it be that the method of open 
coordination will be applied in future to areas, such as employment and social 
policy,  in  which  a  political  consensus  at  EU  level  of  the  kind  needed  to 
underpin new legislative measures, such as directives, is unlikely to emerge; but 
that  hard-law  mechanisms,  including  not  just  harmonization  but  also  court 
judgments  inducing  regulatory  competition,  will  be  used  to  reshape  other 
aspects of the internal market, including corporate governance?  What are the 
risks  involved  in  taking  an  asymmetrical  approach  –  a  process  of  mutual 
observation and ‘learning by monitoring’ for social and employment policy, but 
hard-law intervention based on a single ‘best’ model in the case of company law 
and the internal  market?   To  analyse these questions, section 2 outlines the 
emergence of reflexive forms of governance within the EU and explores some 
of the theoretical ideas underpinning them.  Section 3 then look in more detail at   2 
some recent substantive developments in the fields of company law and social 
policy, and discusses how far they map on to the models of governance which 
are to be found in the theoretical literature.  Section 4 offers an assessment and 
conclusion. 
 
2. Models of governance in the EU  
 
The case for viewing the EU as an innovator in respect of forms of governance 
has been powerfully made by Charles Sabel in a series of papers (see Cohen and 
Sabel, 1997; Gerstenberg and Sabel, 2002), most recently with Jonathan Zeitlin 
(2006).    According  to  this  view,  ‘distinctive  and  surprisingly  effective 
innovations’ have emerged, the essence of which is that ‘the EU is creating a 
single market while constructing a framework within which the member states 
can protect public health and safety in ways that grow out of these traditions and 
allow them to pursue their own best judgements for innovative advance’ (Sabel 
and Zeitlin, 2006: 1-2).  This analysis goes further than merely acknowledging, 
as others have done, the role of deliberation through the role of ‘comitological’ 
committees, or even the use of forms of multi-level ‘concertation’ which tend to 
dissolve  the  distinctions  between  a  central  ‘core’  of  decision-making  and 
national ‘peripheries’.  In addition, a new ‘underlying architecture of public rule 
making’  can  be  observed;  this  ‘can  neither  be  mapped  from  the  topmost 
directives and Treaty provisions nor read out from any textbook account of the 
formal  competences  of  EU  institutions’,  but  it  nevertheless  ‘regularly  and 
decisively shapes EU governance’.  Its essence is the establishment, firstly, of 
‘framework goals’, jointly set by action between the member states and EU 
institutions, such as the goal of a high employment rate set for the employment 
policy OMC in the late 1990s; secondly, the devolution to ‘lower level units’, a 
category  including  but  not  limited  to  member  states,  of  the  means  of 
implementation of these goals; thirdly, the application of a duty on the part of 
those  units  to  report  on  their  performance,  to  benchmark  it  against  agreed 
criteria, and to take part in a peer review process by which their performance is 
judged collectively; and, fourthly, a recursive mechanism through which the 
framework itself is periodically revised in the light of the information produced 
by the benchmarking process.   
 
The  result  is  distinctive,  it  is  argued,  for  the  following  reasons  (Sabel  and 
Zeitlin, 2006: 4-10).  Firstly, the goal of deliberation is not, as has been thought, 
to  reach  agreement  in  the  sense  of  a  ‘reflective  equilibrium’;  rather, 
‘deliberative decision making is driven at least as much by the discussion and 
elaboration of difference’.  Secondly, the result is not, necessarily, to replace 
formal norms with informal ones: ‘those institutions whose explicit purpose is 
to  expose  and  clarify  difference  so  as  to  destabilize  and  disentrench  settled   3 
approaches  are  typically  highly  formalised’.      It  is  not  simply  that  formal 
revisions to directives and national-level laws often result from the processes 
concerned; even where formal laws and sanctions are absent, the consequences 
of non-compliance can be far-reaching, in terms of possible economic losses 
and harm to reputation.  Thirdly, new forms of governance rest not so much 
upon the imposition from above of supposedly optimal regulatory solutions, as 
upon a clear division of labour between EU institutions with responsibility for 
devising frameworks of general application, and the member states whose task 
is to adapt them to local conditions and to contribute, through reporting and 
monitoring,  to  a  collective  learning  process:  ‘the  most  successful  of  these 
arrangements combine the advantages of decentralized local experimentation 
with those of centralized coordination, and so blur the distinction between forms 
of governance often held to have incompatible virtues’.  What this adds up to is 
a type of governance termed directly deliberative polyarchy – ‘polyarchy’ here 
refering to the element of mutual learning through monitoring by lower level 
units – which is, in essence, ‘a machine for learning from diversity’ (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2006: 7-8). 
 
The core illustration of the operation of deliberative polyarchy as a distinctive 
form of governance in the EU, although by no means the only one, is the ‘open 
method  of  coordination’  formally  adopted  at  the  Lisbon  summit  in  2000.  
Formally,  this  had  four  elements:  the  fixing  of  guidelines  at  central  level, 
coupled  with  timetables  for  the  achievement  of  goals;  the  establishment  of 
benchmarks for tailoring performance and allowing the identification of best 
practice at local level; the adoption of specific targets for the implementation of 
guidelines, while taking into account regional and national differences; and a 
process  of  ‘periodic  monitoring,  evaluation  and  peer  review  organized  as 
mutual learning processes’.  Elements of the OMC were already in existence, in 
the form of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines which can be traced back to 
the Treaty of Maastricht, and the Employment Guidelines adopted in relation to 
the European Employment Strategy which was formally embedded in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.  The Lisbon Summit stimulated a proliferation of new OMCs 
across a wide range of areas, which now include pensions policy, strategies on 
social inclusion, and policies on fundamental rights, while looser variants of the 
same idea have been applied in the contexts of research and innovation policy, 
the  ‘information  society’,  and  the  promotion  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises. 
 
The arrival of the OMC appears to mark a fundamental break with what came 
before, and this is often the way in which it has been portrayed by critics and 
opponents alike.  The authors of the OMC, as Sabel and Zeitlin put it, saw it as 
‘a  “third  way”  for  EU  governance  between  regulatory  harmonization  and   4 
fragmentation’ (2006: 27).  However, there is a case for identifying important 
continuities between the OMC and some long-standing debates about the proper 
role of harmonization within the common, later the single, market.   
 
The EU neither had, nor has now, a general power to regulate labour and capital 
markets in the interests of promoting inter-state trade, in contrast to the position, 
for  example,  under  the  federal  United  States  constitution,  whose  commerce 
clause is much more extensive in this regard than its EU counterparts.  The 
EU’s social policy powers were extremely limited from the start (see Deakin, 
1996).  The Treaty of Rome contained only a few provisions on labour law; the 
most important was Article 119 (now 141), which enshrined the right to equal 
pay between men and women.  This provision owed its existence to French 
concerns that its apparently more protective sex discrimination laws would be a 
source of competitive disadvantage.  A similar justification led to the inclusion 
of a Treaty provision relating to annual leave rights.  But for the most part, 
social policy was outside the scope of the Treaty.  This was no accident.  The 
founders of the European Economic Community accepted the view, set out in a 
report commissioned from the ILO, that harmonizing measures in the labour 
law field were unnecessary.  The implementation of the common market was 
expected to lead to upward pressure on wages and social welfare provisions, as 
states competed to attract scarce labour.  At the point, in the mid-1950s, when 
the member states were all politically committed to the expansion of the welfare 
state and to the maintenance of conditions of full employment, this was not an 
unreasonable assumption.  It was not until the early 1970s, when the EEC’s 
expansion  from  six  to  nine  states  coincided  with  the  end  of  the  post-war 
consensus on the welfare state and full employment, that the member states felt 
it necessary to instigate the Community’s first social action programme.  This 
led to directives on equality of treatment and employment protection, which 
were  adopted  using  general  powers  to  regulate  the  common  market.    These 
initiatives paved the way for the significant expansion of social policy measures 
in the 1980s during the period of the Delors presidency.  The Single European 
Act of 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1997 each led to a widening of legislative powers in the social policy field, but 
it remains the case that these powers are narrowly confined, with certain areas 
(most notably minimum wages, collective bargaining and the right to strike) 
excluded altogether from the law making powers of the Community’s central 
organs.  In effect, state autonomy is still the order of the day in the social policy 
field, with only marginal incursions from Community law. 
 
The power to introduce harmonising measures in the field of company law was, 
by contrast to those applying to social policy, both more extensive, and more 
closely related to the original economic objectives of the Community, since it   5 
originated in the freedom of establishment provisions of the Treaty of Rome.  
Under Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome (now 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty), 
the Council was empowered to adopt directives aimed at ‘coordinating to the 
necessary  extent  the  safeguards  which,  for  the  protection  of  the  interests  of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies and firms… 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community’.  
Thus an element of uniformity in the laws protecting the right of shareholders 
and  ‘others’  (this  phrase  could  cover  a  range  of  stakeholder  interests)  was 
thought to be necessary in order to forestall a ‘race to the bottom’.  Directives 
were  adopted  from  the  late  1960s  onwards,  and  by  the  early  1970s  some 
commentators  were  arguing  that  the  Community  needed  a  thorough-going 
harmonization programme; the ‘virtual unification of national company laws’ 
(Schmitthoff, 1973: 9) would ensure that a race to the bottom was avoided.   
 
However, the prescriptive approach of the first company law directive gave way 
to so-called ‘second generation’ measures which set out basic accounting and 
audit  standards  in  the  form  of  a  menu  of  options  based  largely  on  existing 
member  state  practice  (Villiers,  1998).    Member-state  autonomy  was  also 
observed in the ‘third generation’ measures which were based on the principle 
that harmonization should be limited to internventions which could be shown to 
be  essential  to  the  functioning  of  the  single  market,  and  in  the  ‘fourth 
generation’  or  framework  directives  of  the  1990s  which  were  based  on  the 
articulation  of  general  principles  rather  than  detailed  prescription  and  which 
involved a degree of delegation of rule-making powers to trade and professional 
bodies at both member state and transnational level. 
 
There  is  therefore  a  case  for  saying  that  reflexive  forms  of  governance, 
involving a division of labour between EU institutions and the member states 
and commitment to experimentalism based on diversity of practices, were part 
of the EU’s regulatory architecture from the outset.  The decision to attempt 
even the limited degree of harmonization in labour and capital markets which 
was initially envisaged through directives, as opposed to regulations which are 
directly applicable in national law, was itself significant.  Directives are not 
self-enforcing;  they  depend  for  the  effectiveness  on  implementing  measures 
taken by member states.  Directives in the social policy field are by and large 
designed to set a ‘floor of rights’.  This model was established in the 1970s and, 
with some modifications and adaptations, remains the principal approach today. 
Most directives make explicit reference in their texts to ‘minimum standards’ 
which states must observe but on which they can improve, while many also 
contain ‘non-regression clauses’ which are intended to prevent member states 
from using the implementation of a directive to reduce the pre-existing level of   6 
protection  guaranteed  by  national  law.    A  ‘race  to  the  top’  is  thereby 
encouraged. 
 
This distinctive European approach to the regulation of transnational markets 
has been described using the term reflexive harmonization (Deakin, 1999, 2001, 
2006;  Barnard  and  Deakin,  2002;  Zumbansen,  2006).    Instead  of  seeing 
reflexive forms of governance as a ‘third way’ between the standardisation and 
fragmentation of laws, as supporters of the OMC would have it, the guiding 
idea  here  is  that  there  is  no  necessary  opposition  between  regulatory 
competition and harmonization.  Regulatory competition, rather than inevitably 
involving a race to the bottom, should be seen as a process of discovery through 
which knowledge and resources are mobilized in the search for effective and 
workable rules.  The concept of ‘reflexive harmonisation’ is an adaptation of the 
idea that competition is a learning process dependent on norms that establish a 
balance  between  ‘particular’  and  ‘general’  mechanisms  (Sugden  1997:  48); 
between,  that  is,  the  autonomy  of  local  actors,  and  the  mechanisms  which 
ensure  a  process  of  collective  learning  based  on  observation  and 
experimentation.    As  with  theories  of  deliberative  polyarchy,  an  essential 
prerequisite  for  reflexive  harmonization  is  the  preservation  of  local-level 
diversity, since without diversity, the stock of knowledge and experience on 
which the learning process depends is limited in scope.  However, there are 
several  respects  in  which  the  reflexive  harmonization  approach  differs  from 
deliberative polyarchy. 
 
The  theory  of  reflexive  harmonization  was  developed  as  part  of  an  explicit 
engagement  with,  and  response  to,  neoliberal  critics  of  the  EU’s  role  in 
transnational  rule-making.    Those,  for  example,  who  argued  against  the 
European Commission’s social action programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, did 
so on the grounds that variety within the Union as a whole should be preserved: 
‘hidden in the historical experience of economic integration, there is … a very 
important aspect of “system dynamics”: international competition in the field of 
the welfare state serves as a kind of process of discovery to identify which 
welfare state package – for whatever reason – turns out to be economically 
viable in practice’ (Paqué, 1997: 109).  As this critique recognized, there was a 
strong argument against the use of harmonizing legislation to cement in a single 
‘best’ solution.  However, the theory of reflexive harmonization argued that this 
was not a good account of how EU governance worked.  It argued, as we have 
just seen, that European-style harmonization had evolved to play the role of 
maintaining  the  appropriate  relationship  between  ‘particular’  mechanisms 
operating  at  the  sub-federal  level,  and  the  ‘general’  mechanisms  by  which 
learning  across  the  Union  as  a  whole  took  place.    The  model  of  reflexive 
harmonization  held  that  the  principal  objectives  of  judicial  intervention  and   7 
legislative harmonization alike were two-fold: firstly, to protect the autonomy 
and diversity of national or local rule-making systems, while, secondly, seeking 
to ‘steer’ or channel the process of adaptation of rules at state level away from 
‘spontaneous’ solutions which might lock in sub-optimal outcomes, such as a 
‘race to the bottom’ initiated by court-led ‘negative harmonisation’.  In contrast, 
the deliberative polyarchy approach is silent on the role that minimum standards 
might play in shaping the process of transnational integration.  There is nothing 
in  the  deliberative  polyarchy  approach  to  suggest,  for  example,  that 
experimentalist solutions of a deregulatory type should be ruled out in principle, 
and  nor  is  there  any  clear  engagement  with  the  risks  which  this  type  of 
regulatory competition might pose. 
 
The idea of reflexive harmonization was also advanced by way of an explicit 
contrast  with  US  experience.    It  was  common,  in  critiques  of  the  EU’s 
harmonization programmes in the 1980s and 1990s, to contrast a US model of 
state autonomy and inter-jurisdictional competition with a European one centred 
on the application of uniform rules.  However, reflexive harmonization theory 
argued that this view was mistaken.  This is because federal legislation in labour 
and capital markets has been a highly significant presence in the US context 
since the passage of the New Deal legislation of the 1930s.  The law governing 
collective  bargaining  and  union  security  is  federal  law,  in  the  form  of  the 
National Labour Relations Act, which is composed (inter alia) of the Wagner 
Act of 1935 and the amending Taft-Hartley Act 1949.  Thanks to the doctrine of 
pre-emption, these federal statutes occupy the field to the exclusion of state law.  
It was only in those areas where the federal legislature has carved open a space 
for state-level initiative that regulatory competition has been able to develop.  A 
good example of this was the leeway granted to states by the Taft-Hartley Act, 
to enact exceptions to union security laws which underpinned the closed shop.  
This had led to the introduction of ‘right to work’ statutes in many southern and 
western states in the 1950s and 1960s.  In addition, laws which might have 
improved on the protective standards set out by the federal legislation were 
ruled out by the pre-emption doctrine.  In effect, a race to the bottom in labour 
standards was still possible, but a race to the top had been ruled out, the inverse 
of the situation in the EU.  The result was the opposite of an experimentalist 
solution: the rigid and, in the view of many commentators, flawed structure of 
workplace  representation  set  out  originally  in  the  legislation  of  the  1930s 
remained fixed in place (Weiler, 1990).   
 
In  company  law,  the  US  experience  pointed  to  the  dangers  of  allowing 
regulatory competition to operate unconstrained.  The popular image was one of 
a self-forming corporate law emerging on the basis of regulatory competition 
between the states (the ‘Delaware model’). However, this masked the wider   8 
picture.  In the area of securities law, the Securities Act 1933, the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934 and, more recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, were all 
federal statutes. Delaware had, at best, a precarious independence from federal 
control; formally, company law remained the responsibility of the states, but 
federal securities law was always in danger of spilling over into the domain 
supposedly set aside for company law to be set by state courts and legislatures.  
Thus the federal legislator had come to act both as a competitor to Delaware, 
and,  to  a  certain  degree,  as  an  implicit  regulator  of  inter-jurisdictional 
competition (Roe, 2005).  At the same time, Delaware’s preeminence had led to 
a  situation  in  which  the  degree  of  diversity  across  the  different  state 
jurisdictions was far below that which could be found in the EU (Deakin, 1999, 
2001).    This  was  the  consequence  of  the  freedom  which  companies  had  to 
incorporate in the state of their choice, and of a strong version of the mutual 
recognition principle, under which courts in all states were required to recognize 
that choice as far as the ‘internal affairs’ of the corporation were concerned.  In 
the EU, at least until the Centros case was decided (on which, see below), states 
were free to retain the ‘real seat’ principle under which a company’s applicable 
law was the state in which its head office was situated or with which it had the 
strongest functional connection.  This was a vital protection against the ‘race to 
converge’ which the US had experienced as states clustered around the essential 
features of the Delaware model. 
 
The theory of deliberative polyarchy, by contrast, sees the EU as simply one 
case amid a larger set of emerging governance forms to be found at national, 
regional  and  global  level.    Thus  Sabel  and  Zeitlin  cite  instances  of 
experimentalism  in  the  US  including  environmental  protection,  education 
policy, child protection, and food safety.  To some degree, their emphasis on 
EU-US similarities may simply reflect a particular selection of substantive areas 
of law on which to focus; they do not discuss labour or company law, both areas 
of considerable divergence between the EU and the US (as we have just seen), 
in any detail.  Nevertheless, they are prepared to extend the deliberative model 
to  cover  global-level  governance  too:  ‘developments  cast  doubt  on  the 
singularity of the EU’s innovative regulatory architecture’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2006: 71), with the WTO and ILO, among others, beginning to borrow elements 
of the OMC approach.   
 
Whether the OMC truly represents a template for the global governance of the 
near future is a matter to which we shall return.  The next step in the analysis is 
to consider how far the models of governance just described are reflected in 
some recent substantive developments in the areas of company law and labour 
law. 
   9 
3.  Recent  developments  in  governance  at  EU  level:  company  law  and 
labour law compared 
 
Since the turn of the century there has been what seems, on the face of it, to be a 
huge increase in the volume and range of EU level company law.  Important 
new directives have been adopted on takeover bids,
1 cross-border mergers,
2 the 
responsibilities  of  boards  for  financial  statements  and  key  non-financial 
information,
3  transparency  requirements  for  publicly  traded  companies,
4  the 
conditions for incorporating a company as a Societas Europaea or European 
Company,
5 and the rights of shareholders in listed companies.
6   Two significant 
recommendations have been published, one on directors’ remuneration
7 and one 
on  the  duties  of  non-executive  or  supervisory  directors  and  the  role  of 
committees of the board.
8  Corporate governance now has its own OMC, of a 
kind, thanks to the establishment of a process deliberation over principles of 
general application, under the auspices of the European Corporate Governance 
Forum.   
 
By  contrast,  labour  law  initiatives  seem  log-jammed.    Three  measures,  on 
parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term employment,
9 were adopted in the 
late  1990s  as  ‘framework  agreements’  under  the  social  dialogue  procedure 
which enables the force of a directive to be given to accords made by the social 
partners at EU level, and a new directive on information and consultation of 
employees was agreed in 2002,
10 after the failure of the social dialogue process 
in this case.  Since then, there has been a failure to reach agreement on the 
revision of the Working Time Directive, and it is widely believed that new 
measures in the social policy field, at least in so far as they are concerned with 
substantive regulation of terms and conditions of employment as opposed to 
procedures for information and consultation of employees, will struggle to win 
political acceptance.  While labour law is stalled, attention has focused instead 
on the employment strategy OMC, which, has generated an active debate about 
the merits and demerits, from the point of view of competitiveness, of particular 
features of national labour law systems.   
 
This preliminary view, of a strong contrast between the different trajectories of 
company and labour law at EU level since 2000 or so, is not entirely false, but 
closer  inspection  suggests  that  the  recent  experiences  share  certain  common 
features.   
 
There  are  elements  of  the  legislative  programme  in  company  law  which 
conform to a conception of harmonisation as standardization, and which as a 
result  have  little  if  any  common  ground  with  deliberative  or  reflexive 
approaches.  The first significant document in the current round of initiatives   10 
was the report of the High Level Group of Experts on takeover bids, published 
in October 2002.  This argued that what the EU needed was ‘an  integrated 
capital  market’  in  which  ‘the  regulation  of  takeover  bids  [would  be]  a  key 
element’ (High Level Group, 2002a: 18).  The report noted that ‘the extent to 
which in a given securities market takeover bids can take place and succeed is 
determined  by  a  number  of  factors’,  including  general  or  structural  factors 
affecting  financial  markets,  and  company-specific  factors  such  as  rules  of 
company law and articles of association affecting voting rights, protection of 
minority  shareholders,  and  the  legitimacy  of  takeover  defences.    It  then 
observed that ‘there are many differences between the Member States in terms 
of  such  general  and  company  specific  factors’,  with  the  result  that  the  EU 
lacked a ‘level playing field’.   
 
The substantive content of state-level company laws was also an issue for the 
High Level Group.  The  essence of the problem was that the laws of most 
member states did not sufficiently conform to a model of corporate governance 
in  which  managers  understood  their  principal  duty  to  return  value  to 
shareholders,  and  in  which  takeovers  played  a  crucial  disciplinary  role  in 
reminding them of this obligation: 
 
‘actual  and  potential  takeover  bids  are  an  important  means  to 
discipline  the  management  of  listed  companies  with  dispersed 
ownership,  who  after  all  are  the  agents  of  shareholders.  If 
management is performing poorly or unable to take advantage of 
wider opportunities the share price will generally under-perform in 
relation to the company’s potential and a rival company and its 
management  will  be  able  to  propose  an  offer  based  on  their 
assertion  of  their  greater  competence.    Such  discipline  of 
management and reallocation of resources is in the long term in the 
best interests of all stakeholders, and society at large. These views 
also form the basis for the Directive’ (High Level Group, 2002a: 
19). 
 
The  High  Level  Group  could  not  have  been  clearer:  they  were  proposing  a 
measure based on the standard finance-theory or ‘principal-agent’ view of the 
role of hostile takeover bids in enhancing shareholder value.  The assertion that 
managers are ‘after all’ the agents of shareholders in one based on a particular 
economic-theoretical  position,  and  has  little  or  no  grounding  in  the  legal 
conceptions of the company which the High Level Group might have looked for 
in the laws of the Member States.  Even UK company law does not go this far; 
it has not followed the Delaware practice of sometimes referring to duties owed 
by directors to the shareholders rather than to the company as a separate entity.    11 
Be that as it may, it was very largely to the UK that the EU experts looked to fill 
out the content of the Directive. Even more so than its many predecessors, this 
draft  of  the  Thirteenth  Directive  drew  on  the  model  of  the  City  Code  on 
Takeovers and Mergers, a text notable for the high level of protection it gives 
minority  shareholders  and  for  its  restriction  of  poison  pills  and  other  anti-
takeover defences which US law, which is other takeover-friendly, by and large 
allows (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997). 
 
The High Level Group’s second report, in November 2002, struck a similar note 
in  stressing  the  role  of  non-executive  directors  in  monitoring  management, 
which  is  a  feature  of  British  and  American  practice,  but  is  relatively 
underdeveloped in other member states: 
 
‘Good corporate governance requires a strong and balanced board 
as  a  monitoring  body  for  the  executive  management  of  the 
company.  Executive managers manage the company ultimately on 
behalf  of  the  shareholders.    In  companies  with  dispersed 
ownership,  shareholders  are  usually  unable  to  closely  monitor 
management,  its  strategies  and  its  performance  for  lack  of 
information and resources.  The role of non-executive directors in 
one-tier  board  structures  and  supervisory  directors  in  two-tier 
board  structures  is  to  fill  this  gap  between  the  uninformed 
shareholders  as  principals  and  the  fully  informed  executive 
managers as agents by monitoring the agents more closely’ (High 
Level Group, 2002b: 59). 
 
Again, the standard finance-orientated or ‘principal-agent’ model was stressed, 
and a feature of the British and American systems was presented as if it had 
universal validity.  Features of national systems which did not conform to the 
principal-agent approach, such as the distinctive role of worker directors and 
community representatives in two-tier boards, were simply shoehorned into the 
supposedly universal model.  The High Level Group’s second report set out a 
series of objectives for reform of corporate governance (among other things) 
which reflected this point of view, and which were then incorporated into the 
Commission’s Action Plan on company law, with effect from 2003.
11 
 
What happened next, and in particular the fate of the Thirteenth Directive, is 
instructive.  Although the Directive was eventually adopted, in 2004,
12 this was 
only after a series of compromises had been agreed, which considerably diluted 
the draft presented by the Commission in 2002.  Contrary to the expectation that 
the Directive would roll out a liberal-market model of takeover regulation along 
similar lines to that of the UK’s City Code on Mergers and Takeovers, in its   12 
final form it allows member states to retain laws which permit multiple voting 
rights and limit shareholder sovereignty in various ways, such as allowing anti-
takeover  defences  to  be  put  in  place  in  advance  of  bids.    Some  of  these 
provisions are transitional; the general thrust of the Directive, which is still in 
favour  of  the  principle  of  one  share  one  vote  and  proportionality  between 
investment risks and decision-making powers, is clear.  Yet, rather than impose 
a single model on member states, the Directive can be seen as setting out an 
experimentalist  framework  for  law-making  at  state  level.  This  was  far  from 
being its original objective.   But the result of the rough-hewn  compromises 
which  informed  the  final  text  of  the  Directive  is  that  the  liberalisation  of 
takeover rules can be achieved in one of several different ways, which may take 
into account specific features of the legal and institutional environments of the 
different member states. 
 
Another significant feature of the Thirteenth Directive is the reformed takeover 
rules  made  provision  for  information  and  consultation  of  employees.    An 
element of employee consultation was present in earlier drafts of this Directive, 
and the provisions on this issue which were included in the final text are not 
especially far-reaching, and do not go as far as the laws of a number of member 
states.  However, the Thirteenth Directives is part of a pattern, with mandatory 
employee consultation provisions included in a number of other company law 
directives  passed  around  this  time,  including  the  directive  on  cross-border 
mergers, as well as the Societas Europaea measures (where again there has been 
a  long  debate  on  this  issue).    This  illustrates  the  complexities  involved  in 
translating the principal-agent model of corporate governance into specific legal 
provisions.  The finance theory espoused by the High Level Group finds no 
room  for  managerial  engagement  with  employees  on  issues  of  corporate 
governance, regarding such engagement as a qualification to the principle of 
shareholder-based  control  of  the  firm.    However,  the  issue  of  employee 
involvement is unavoidable when it comes to legislating at EU level.  This is 
not  just  because  organised  labour  interests  have  numerous  possibilities  for 
presenting their view when directives are being formulated, but also because the 
principle of employee consultation in the event of corporate restructurings has 
come to be recognised, over several decades, as an important point of reference 
within the EU legal order, as it is embodied in numerous labour law directives 
as well as in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  It was never going to be 
likely that the new company law directives could simply ignore the issue.   
 
A further paradoxical and perhaps unexpected consequence is that, following 
the adoption of the Thirteenth Directive, the UK rules on takeover bids have had 
to be substantially modified in order to accommodate the employee consultation 
principle.  The UK’s City Code may have provided the model for the Directive,   13 
but  the  Code  could  not  remain  unaffected  by  the  wider  implications  for 
corporate  governance  of  the  Directive’s  adoption.    In  particular,  more 
prescriptive provisions concerning the potential impact of takeovers on employees 
have had to be introduced.  The bidder must now provide detailed information on 
its strategic intentions with regard to the target, possible job losses, and changes to 
terms and conditions of employment,
13 and the target must give its views, in the 
defence document, on the implications of the bid for employment.
14  Breach of 
these  provisions  is  a  criminal  offence,  and  they  have  potentially  significant 
implications for employees’ consultation rights under UK labour law (see Deakin, 
2007).  In addition, employee representatives of the target have the right to have 
their views of the effects of the bid on employment included in relevant defence 
document issued by the target.
15  The full impact of these rules on UK takeover 
law and practice remains to be seen, but their adoption illustrates the destabilizing 
effects  which  the  process  of  EU  law  making  can  often  have  on  apparently 
entrenched arrangements at state-level.   
 
There are other signs that the so-called modernisation of company law is not 
proceeding in a straightforwardly linear fashion towards the instantiation of the 
agency model, and that the reform process has had to take on board the diversity 
of  state-level  practices.    Corporate  governance  even  has  its  own  OMC-type 
mechanism,  thanks  to  the  establishment  of  establishment  in  2003  of  the 
European Corporate Governance Forum.  The Forum’s existence was prefigured 
in the November 2002 report of the High Level Group, which recommended 
that the Commission  
 
‘set up a structure which facilitates the coordination of the Member 
States’ efforts to improve corporate governance.  Member States 
should  be  required  to  participate  in  the  coordination,  but  the 
process itself and the results of the process should be voluntary and 
non-binding.  Market participants (including of course companies) 
should  be  invited  to  be  actively  involved  in  the  coordination 
exercise’ (High Level Group, 2002b: 73). 
 
In practice, the European Corporate Governance Forum represents something 
less than a fully fledged OMC for company law.  Its members, ‘15 outstanding 
high level experts in corporate governance’,
16 are selected by the Commission.  
The composition of the group is intended ‘to ensure a balanced representation of 
all those having an interest in sound corporate governance practices: investors, 
issuers, regulators, worker representatives and academics’.
17  The task of the 
Forum  has  been  described  as  ‘to  help  the  convergence  of  national  efforts, 
encourage best practice and advise the Commission’.
18  It meets three times a 
year and its published minutes indicate that most of its business so far has been   14 
devoted to discussion of a number of corporate governance issues, most notably 
the operation of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in state-level codes (that is, 
the principle that companies may either comply with the provisions of codes on 
board structure and other aspects of governance, or issue a statement explaining 
why they have not done so).  As part of this process, the Forum a statement of 
its own on the ‘comply or explain’ principle which is akin to a guidance note.  
The Forum has expressed its intention to approach regulatory bodies and other 
relevant organs at member state level with a view to collecting information on 
corporate governance practices, but whether this will mature into a peer-review 
or benchmarking process, is not yet clear.   
 
Only  one  trade  unionist  sits  on  the  group;  most  of  its  members  are  senior 
representatives of financial industry trade associations, institutional shareholder 
groups, and bodies which campaign for enhanced shareholder protection.  At its 
June 2006 meeting, the Forum heard a presentation from the European Trade 
Union  Confederation  on  the  role  of  employees  as  stakeholders  in  corporate 
governance.    The  nature  of  the  Forum’s  likely  future  attitude  to  issues  of 
employee involvement can be inferred from this entry in the minutes: 
 
‘members pointed out to possible risks of including employees and 
other stakeholders into the corporate governance debate.  In some 
cases, their interests are used by the management as an excuse for 
following its own line and acting contrary to the interests of the 
shareholders.  This can even result into being detrimental to the 
employees  who  increasingly  are  shareholders  themselves,  either 
directly or through their pension funds.  One member also pointed 
out to the OECD principles [on corporate governance] that deal 
with the position of employees only in very general terms and took 
the view that the Forum should stay within that framework’.
19 
 
In other respects, there are signs that both the Forum and the Internal Market 
Directorate to which it reports are broadly committed to the convergence of EU 
systems  around  the  global  corporate  governance  standard  embodied  in  the 
OECD principles, and which is closely aligned to US and UK practice.  While 
references  are  made  to  the  importance  of  understanding  diversity  in  the 
company laws of the member states, there is an underlying emphasis on the role 
of the Commission in encouraging convergence.  Sometimes this takes the form 
of the suggestion that ‘a process of convergence in Member States’s approaches 
to Corporate Governance is already underway’,
20 with comply or explain being 
used  as  the  foremost  illustration;  on  other  occasions,  the  need  for  further 
reforms is stressed: 
   15 
‘Why should the Commission step up to meet the challenge and 
become embroiled in matters which most often depend on national 
laws and regulations, as well as traditions and practices?  Basically 
because what is at stake is of enormous concern at the European 
level,  cannot  be  achieved  solely  through  competition  across 
systems,  and  sometimes  requires  a  determined  fight  against 
perverse  national  behaviour.    Corporate  governance  differences 
and related discrepancies in corporate law are very often powerful 
barriers  to  integration,  which  stand  in  the  way  of  the  Internal 
Market.    If  these  barriers  did  not  exist,  if  investors  could  not 
confidently buy equity in countries other than their own and feel 
that  they  had  the  same  rights  and  obligations  as  in  their  home 
markets,  if  the  control  of  a  corporation  was  open  to  the  most 
competent  managers,  irrespective  of  their  nationalities,  the 
efficiency of European capital markets would improve markedly, 
and the quality and performance of management would certainly 
have to meet higher standards’.
21 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  Forum  has  not  yet  got  to  the  state  of  initiating  a 
benchmarking  programme  designed  to  test  member  states’  compliance  with 
what  it  takes  to  be  internationally  accepted  corporate  governance  standards; 
similarly, the Internal Market Directorate has stated that it has no intention of 
initiating  a  harmonisation  programme  aimed  at  removing  national 
‘discrepancies’,  and  has  set  its  face  against  such  initiatives  such  as  the 
promulgation of an EU-wide corporate governance code.   But this does not 
mean that it is neutral on the question of the kind of company law systems and 
corporate governance regimes to which EU member states should be moving.  
There is a growing stress, not on harmonisation in the traditional sense of the 
standardisation of rules, nor even on open coordination as a basis for mutual 
learning,  but  instead  on  a  framework  of  rules  which  will  bring  about 
convergence  by  providing  maximum  cross-border  mobility  for  capital.    The 
emerging principle is that ‘[w]here various alternative systems exist in Member 
States for elements of the company’s organisation and structure, the EU should 
as  much  as  possible  facilitate  freedom  of  choice  between  these  alternative 
systems  for  companies  across  Europe,  rather  than  trying  to  agree  upon  one 
specific EU system or leaving the option to Member States ’.   
 
This view fits in with the wider market liberalisation agenda of the Internal 
Market Directorate, as expressed in the case of the Services Directive among 
others, and with the the ECJ’s decision in the Centros case,
22 which by casting 
considerable doubt on the ‘real seat’ principle, has opened up the possibility of 
regulatory competition along US lines finally arriving in the EU.   16 
 
The ECJ’s case law has long accepted the principles of mutual recognition and 
non-discrimination, albeit with some significant doctrinal distinctions according 
to the precise context which is being considered.  However, these principles 
have also been subject both to provisions of the EC Treaty itself which embody 
a  number  of  derogations  on  public  policy  grounds  from  the  free  movement 
principle, and to a further set of derogations developed by the Court itself as its 
jurisprudence has evolved.  Thus from the inception of this process, respect for 
the autonomy and territorial sovereignty of the member states has operated as a 
countervailing force to pressure for economic liberalisation. 
 
The Centros case placed critical pressure on this long-standing compromise.  
Only a minority of member states observe the state of incorporation rule under 
which a company is free, by virtue of its decision on incorporation, to choose 
the law which applies to its internal governance.  Most member states have 
traditionally observed the real sea principle which generally means that courts 
will regard the applicable law as that of the member state in which the company 
has its main centre of operations – its head office or principal place of business.  
The  effect  has  been  to  render  impossible  the  kind  of  market  for  corporate 
charters  or  constitutions  which  operates  in  the  US,  since  a  company  cannot 
switch its state of incorporation at will.  The legality of the siège réel doctrine 
was an obvious target for free movement jurisprudence from an early stage but 
the  process  took  a  decisive  turn  in  favour  of  a  strict  reading  of  the  free 
movement principles after Centros.  Two Danish citizens incorporated a private 
company of which they were the sole shareholders, named Centros Ltd., in the 
UK.    One  of  the  two  shareholders  then  applied  to  have  a  ‘branch’  of  the 
company registered in Denmark for the purposes of carrying on business there.  
Centros Ltd. had never traded in the UK.  The Danish Registrar of Companies 
refused to register the branch, on the grounds that what the company was trying 
to do was not to register not a branch or overseas presence, but its principal 
business establishment.  The Registrar took the view that Centros Ltd. had been 
incorporated in the UK in order to avoid Danish minimum capital requirements 
which are designed to protect creditors and minimise the risk of fraud.  The 
Court ruled that the refusal to accede to the registration request was contrary to 
the freedom of establishment principle.  The ruling by no means closes the door 
to a proportionality-type argument to the effect that the measure in question 
meets a legitimate aim of public policy in an acceptable way.  However, the 
rather peremptory way in which the Court brushed aside the policy arguments in 
favour of creditor protection legislation in Centros (see Deakin, 1999) does not 
bode well for any future attempt to argue that the maintenance of the real state 
principle for the purpose of upholding codetermination laws, for example, can   17 
be justified on the grounds of the economic and social benefits of employee 
participation in the processes of corporate governance.   
 
Employee representation rights in the context of cross-border  movements of 
capital is one of the issues being addressed by the Commission as part of the 
process of consultation over the draft Fourteenth Company Law Directive.  But 
the Fourteenth Directive, assuming it is ever agreed, may be too little, too late.  
The response of the corporate sector to Centros and related case-law indicates 
some potential consequences of going down the path of uncontrolled regulatory 
competition.      Tens  of  thousands  of  Danish  and  German  SMEs  have 
incorporated or reincorporated in the UK, taking advantage of Centros to avoid 
minimum capital requirements (see Armour, 2005; Becht, Mayer and Wagner, 
2005), and several countries have begun to water down their creditor protection 
laws.    Corporate  migration  is  also  being  motivated  by  the  desire  to  avoid 
codetermination laws.  In May 2006 the German airline Air Berlin registered as 
a UK-based plc, apparently in order to avoid German codetermination laws, a 
move which, it has been predicted, others will follow.
23 
 
As already noted, labour law reform has proceeded at a much slower pace, in 
the 2000s, than has been the case for company law, and attention has focused 
instead  on  the  OMC  for  employment  strategy,  which  is  much  more  highly 
developed,  and  institutionally  embedded,  than  its  company  law  counterpart.  
This does not mean, however, that labour law has stood still.  The employment 
strategy OMC has stimulated a debate about the appropriate balance between 
flexibility and inclusion in labour law which is reflected in the Commission’s 
2006  Green  Paper,  but  also  in  the  reaction  of  member  states  to  the  social 
dialogue directives adopted in the late 1990s.  There is case for saying that there 
this has been area of some considerable innovation in governance.  
 
It  was  the  Maastricht  Treaty  which  established  a  role  for  ‘social  dialogue’ 
between the peak-level federations representing trade unions and employers’ 
associations  in  the  formulation  of  EU-level  labour  standards.    One  possible 
option is for framework agreements between the ‘social partners’ to be given 
legal effect as directives; this is the route which resulted in the adoption of 
directives on parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term employment in the 
late 1990s.
24  Another possibility is for the Community’s regular law-making 
organs to act in a case where the social partners cannot reach a consensus on a 
framework agreement.  This was the route eventually taken in the case of the 
directive on information and consultation of employees at national level which 
was adopted in 2002.
25  A third possibility is for the social partners to reach an 
agreement which has no independent legal force, and which they monitor and   18 
police; an agreement along these lines on employment conditions in teleworking 
was arrived at in 2004.
26 
 
Each of the directives just referred to sets out standards in the form of default 
provisions which can be adjusted through agreement between the social actors 
at sectoral, enterprise or plant level.  It is therefore likely – indeed, intended – 
that a variety of practices will result from the implementation of the directives.  
The impact, to date, of the three directives adopted in the late 1990s, suggests 
that this mode of governance can create act as a catalyst for mutual learning.  
These directives have a number of related goals, principal among which is the 
so-called  ‘normalisation’  of  so-called  flexible  forms  of  work  (part-time  and 
fixed-term  employment).    This  implies  some  re-regulation,  in  the  form  of  a 
requirement  of  equality  treatment  between  part-time  and  fixed-term  workers 
respectively and ‘normal’ full-time, indefinite-duration workers, and a degree of 
liberalisation, in the form of the removal of barriers to the adoption of flexible 
working  arrangements.    Encouragement  for  parents  to  share  childcare 
responsibilities is a linked aspect of this policy.   
 
The directives have had divergent effects, depending on the pre-existing state of 
the  law  in  different  member  states  (Mückenberger  and  Weinreich,  2006; 
Deakin, 2006).  In Germany, the fixed-term employment directive has led to a 
de facto loosening of the conditions for this form of employment, which are 
now spelled out in legislation where before they were the result of case law.  In 
Britain, by contrast, where no justification for departing from the ‘norm’ of an 
indefinite-duration contract of employment was previously needed, the directive 
has had the effect of requiring such a justification for the first time in a way 
which is having a substantial impact on employment practices in sectors reliant 
on fixed-term employment.  In Germany the legislation implementing the part-
time work directive went beyond what was necessary in enacting a right to work 
part-time  where  family  circumstances  justified  it;  in  Britain,  a  more  limited 
right  to  request  flexible  working  was  enacted  as  part  of  a  wider  process  of 
legislating  for  ‘work-life  balance’  issues,  but  legislation  has  continued  to 
progress towards a more complete recognition of the right to flexible working, 
as has the practice in certain sectors.  Finally, the passage of the parental leave 
directive  has  triggered  a  debate  in  both  countries  about  a  system  of  leave-
sharing between female and male parents, a system which is not required by the 
directive  but  around  which  a  political  consensus  appears  to  be  building, 
influenced by the example of existing practice in the Nordic member states.  In 
short, convergence on a uniform set of legal instruments for regulating flexible 
work and the work-life balance is unlikely to be the end result of the process of 
implementation  of  these  directives;  however,  that  process  has  triggered  a 
reassessment of policy which may lead in time to a reassessment of national   19 
practices in at least two member states whose laws were previously at opposite 
ends of the spectrum.   
 
But  as  with  company  law,  developments  in  labour  law  are  increasingly 
overshadowed  by  the  possibility  that  the  Court  will  use  its  freedom  of 
movement  jurisprudence  to  mount  a  challenge  to  the  autonomy  of  member 
states.  Two high-profile cases in which the freedom of movement principle has 
recently run up against social policy considerations are Viking
27 and Laval.
28  
Viking concerns the reflagging of a Finnish passenger vessel under Estonian law 
in order to reduce labour costs associated with Finnish labour legislation and 
collective agreements, a move which was prevented by industrial action; Laval 
arises  from  industrial  action  taken  by  Swedish  unions  to  force  a  Lithuanian 
building  company,  carrying  out  work  in  Sweden  using  workers  who  were 
Lithuanian nationals, to observe the terms of a local collective agreement.  In 
Viking the legality of the industrial action was challenged on the grounds of its 
incompatibility with the principle of freedom of establishment (as in Centros), 
while in Laval the challenge mainly invoked the principle of freedom to supply 
services.  At the time of writing, the Advocates General involved in the cases 
have  both  produced  an  opinion;
29  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  the  Court  will 
finally resolve the questions at stake.  One possible outcome, which has been 
foreshadowed  in  the  two  opinions  so  far  issued,  is  that  the  right  to  take 
industrial action will be found to subject to the free movement principle, and 
that it will be left up to national courts to strike a balance between the two 
according  to  the  principle  of  proportionality.    The  application  of  a 
proportionality test makes future litigation more likely, whatever the result in 





The recent experience of company law presents a multi-faceted picture from the 
point of view of governance.  Although there have been very substantial new 
initiatives  in  the  company  law  field,  prospects  for  the  standardisation  of 
company laws, which briefly resurfaced in the early 2000s in the context of 
deliberations over the Thirteenth Directive,   have once again receded, in part as 
a result of the outcome of that process, which some have seen permitting an 
undesirable fragmentation of state-level laws.  The same outcome can however 
be understood as introducing a reflexive element into the application at member 
state level of the general principles now governing takeover bids.  Fragments of 
an  OMC  for  company  law  can  also  be  identified,  in  the  activities  of  the 
European Corporate Governance Forum.  However, this currently falls far short   20 
of a full information exchange, nor is there any effective benchmarking or peer 
review, as yet.   
 
More generally, the company law reform process demonstrates a fixation on a 
particular conception of best practice, which is represented by the principal-
agent  model  of  corporate  governance,  in  particular  as  it  is  expressed  in  the 
‘global standard’ set by the OECD principles and, to a large degree, by US and 
British  practice.    Diversity  of  practice  at  member  state  level  is  also  being 
potentially undermined by the increased possibilities for corporate migration 
following the Centros case, and by the Commission’s support for the principle 
of  cross-border  ‘freedom  of  choice’  in  the  matter  of  corporate  governance 
forms. 
 
Labour law, despite the recent political log-jam on new regulatory measures 
such as the revisions to the Working Time Directive, represents a more hopeful 
case for methods of open coordination.  The employment strategy OMC has 
dovetailed with the social dialogue directives of the late 1990s to stimulate a 
range  of  state-level  responses  to  the  Commission’s  demand  for  a  better 
reconciliation of the goals of flexibility and protection.  At the same time, the 
submerged tension between member state autonomy in the social policy field, 
and  the  integrationist  tendencies  of  the  legislation  and  case  law  relating  to 
freedom of movement, has been cast into sharp relief by the Viking and Laval 
litigation.   
 
This review of recent developments prompts the following reflections on the 
prospects  for  the  OMC  and  for  the  wider  case  which  has  been  made  for 
deliberative polyarchy as a mode of governance.   
 
Firstly, clarity would be assisted in current debates if there were a more explicit 
recognition that the OMC is not a radical break with the past but is the latest in 
a series of developments which have seen the emergence and application of 
reflexive modes of governance in the EU.  The origins of reflexive governance 
go back to the early years of the Community and to developments in the 1980s 
and  1990s  which  the  theory  of  deliberative  polyarchy  appears  to  have 
overlooked. 
 
Secondly,  as  Charles  Sabel  and  Jonathan  Zeitlin  rightly  emphasise  in  their 
account  of  deliberative  polyarchy,  the  ‘informal’  mechanisms  of  the  OMC 
should  be  seen  as  complementary  to  the  ‘formal’  ones  associated  with  law-
making via directives and court judgments.  Effective interaction between the 
framework rules set by the EU and the responses of member states is most   21 
likely  to  occur  when  a  combination  of  informal  and  formal  mechanisms  is 
present.   
 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the most important choice facing the EU in terms of 
governance is not that between formality and informality.  Labour law, rather 
than suffering from the effects of ‘asymmetric regulation’ or a lack of formally 
binding  measures  by  comparison  with  company  law  since  the  turn  of  the 
century, has benefited from the flexibility offered by the OMC in combination 
with the social dialogue procedure for law making.  Rather, the critical issue, 
which affects both company law and labour law, is how to resolve the tension 
between member state autonomy and the requirements of economic integration 
at EU level.  Proponents of deliberative polyarchy claim that it enables market 
liberalization  to  proceed  alongside  the  preservation  and  reconfiguration  of 
national-level systems of social protection.  This claim arguably understates the 
risks inherent in the appearance of a form of relatively unconstrained regulatory 
competition  which,  in  the  name  of  freedom  of  choice,  has  the  potential  to 
undermine national-level decision making.  The problem here is not simply that 
the OMC, in particular, and deliberative polyarchy, more generally, provide a 
weak bulwark, at best, against the deployment of free movement jurisprudence 
and the logic of cross-border freedom of choice to impose a market integration 
test  on state-level regulation.   The learning model embedded in deliberative 
polyarchy is itself part of the problem.  As the case of the company law OMC 
illustrates, the learning process which is at the core of the open method, while 
paying lip service to cross-national diversity, can degenerate into a mechanism 
for entrenching a single ‘best model’, against which the practices of the member 
states  are  subsequently  benchmarked.    This  can  be  contrasted  with  learning 
models, such as those associated with the model of reflexive harmonization, 
which are more clearly focused on the preservation of diversity as such.  Claims 
for the OMC as a template for global governance should, for this reason, be 
very carefully scrutinized. 
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Notes 
 
1  Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. 
2  Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies. 
3 Directive 2006/46/EC on board responsibilities and improvement of financial 
information relating to financial and corporate governance matters. 
4 Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers who securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market. 
5 Regulation 2001/2157/EC on the Statute for a European company (SE) and 
Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees. 
6   This measure was formally adopted in June 2007.  For the provisional text, 
see Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coucil on the exercise of 
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, PE CONS 3608/07, 1 June 
2007. 
7   Recommendation 2004/913/EC fostering an appropriate regime for the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies. 
8   Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory 
directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. 
9   Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave UNICE, 
CEEP and the ETUC, Directive 97/81/EC concerning the framework agreement 
on part-time work concluded by  UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, and Directive 
99/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work UNICE, 
CEEP and the ETUC. 
10  Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community. 
11   See High Level Group, 2002a: 10-12.  On the Action Plan, and its 
development since 2002, see Commission, 2003, and the company law website 
of the Internal Market Directorate: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 
12   Directive 2004/25/EC. 
13   City Code, rule 24.1. 
14   Ibid, rule 25.1(b). 
15   City Code, rule 30.2(b).  This is however subject to the target board 
receiving the employee representatives’ views in good time, which may not 
always be straightforward.  See Takeover Panel 2006: 32-3, for discussion. 
   23 
 
16  Speech of Commissioner Bolkestein, European Corporate Governance 
Conference, The Hague, 18 October 2004, available on the Internal Market 
Directorate company law website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the European Corporate Governance Forum, 
1 June 2006, available on the European Corporate Governance Forum website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm. 
20   Speech of Commissioner Bolkestein, Conference on the German Corporate 
Governance Code, 24 June 2004, available on the Internal Market Directorate 
company law website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 
21   Speech of Mr. Antonio M. Borges, member of the European Corporate 
Governance Forum, to the Hearing on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on 
Company Law and Corporate Governance, Brussels, 3 May 2006, available on 
the  Internal Market Directorate company law website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 
22  Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selkabsstryrelsen, [1999] ECR I-
1459. 
23  ‘German companies flee to the UK’, Financial Times, 24 June 2006. 
24   Respectively, Directives 96/34, 97/81/EC and 99/70/EC. 
25   Directive 2002/14/EC. 
26   Social Partners’ Framework Agreement on Teleworking, 16 July 2002. 
27   Viking Line ABP v. International Transport Workers’ Federation [2006] 1 
CMLR 27; see Davies, 2006. 
28   Swedish Labour Court Decision 2005 No. 49; see Eklund, 2006. 
29   See Case C-438/05 ITWF v. Viking Line ABP, opinion of Poiares Maduro 
AG, 23.5.2007; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska 
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